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   Group Reciprocity 
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People exhibit group reciprocity when they retaliate, not against the person who 
harmed them, but against somebody else in that person's group. Group 
reciprocity may be a key motivation behind intergroup conflict. We investigated 
group reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. After a group identity 
manipulation, subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma with others from different 
groups. Subjects then allocated money between themselves and others, learning 
the group of the others. Subjects who knew that their partner in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma  had  defected  became  relatively less generous to people from the 
partner's group, compared to a third group. We use our experiment to develop 
hypotheses about group reciprocity and its correlates. 
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Saturday 27th January 2001 – A 23 year old white man, Mark Clayton, was stabbed and assaulted by a 
group of Asian teenagers in a subway near Manchester Street, Oldham, in what remains the worst racist 
attack of the current troubled period. ... 
February/March – Some continuing racist violence, e.g. an attack on an Asian man outside a pub by 
four white men on 23rd February .... 
April – A series of racist attacks, mainly by groups of Asian youths on lone white men, continues to 
make the headlines in Oldham.... 
21st-25th May – A series of incidents occurred during this week at Breeze Hill School.... On 21st May, 
a group of white ex-pupils attacked some Asian pupils, and there was stone throwing and verbal abuse. 
... 




Laboratory experiments have persuaded many economists that humans are reciprocators, who 
will pay so as to punish unkind actions, both towards them and others. Real-world examples 
like the above show that people sometimes strike back, not against the individual who caused 
the harm, but against other people in that individual's group. We call this kind of retaliation 
group reciprocity.  
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 066Acts of group reciprocity are central to human conflict. Almost all violent conflicts involve 
calls for revenge against an opposing group for previous harms, which may be real or 
imaginary, and recent or very old.
1 Group reciprocity can also be seen in ordinary economic 
behaviour. For instance, consumers may boycott the produce of countries whose policies they 
disapprove of. German products were boycotted in Greece as reaction to a German news 
magazine's headline calling Greeks “Crooks in the European Family” in early 2010.
2
Although group reciprocal behaviour has been attested beyond reasonable doubt, that does not 
prove that humans have a psychological disposition to it. Acts of group reciprocity could be 
undertaken by materially self-interested, rational actors. For example, doing so might help 
someone to build a reputation for toughness. Or, not doing so might expose one to 
punishment from others in one's own group: one eyewitness of the Rwandan genocide stated 
“ten percent helped; 30 percent were forced to kill; 20 percent killed reluctantly; 40 percent 
killed enthusiastically” (Mamdani 2001).  
 
Companies and teams can also be relevant groups for reciprocity: Dick Fuld, former CEO of 
Lehman Brothers, advised his employees “if one of your teammates gets attacked, fight back 
like hell” (Sorkin 2009)! 
However, as the quote suggests, some people may have a psychological disposition to group-
reciprocate. To investigate whether this is the case, we run a laboratory experiment in which 
1  For many examples, see Horowitz (1985; 2001). 
2   The boycott of a company’s products may eventually also turn into violence. In 1995, for example, the Shell 
Corporation decided to sink the oil drilling platform “Brent Spar” in the Northern Sea, a decision which 
triggered massive protest all over Europe. Further, as German newspapers reported, several tenants o Shell 
Patrol Stations in Gemany received bomb threats, at least one of them actually receiving a letter bomb. 
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3
Acts of group reciprocity may be carried out by either the attacked individual, or his or her 
group members. For instance, most participants in the Oldham race riots had probably not 
themselves been victims of violence by the other ethnic group. Instead, they may have seen 
themselves as taking action on behalf of their fellow group members. In this paper, we 
investigate direct group reciprocity, i.e. reciprocity by the harmed individual himself, leaving 
indirect group reciprocity for future work. Reciprocity can normally be positive as well as 
negative. That is, one may reward others for their helpful behaviour as well as punishing them 
for harmful behaviour. Some of our results could be framed in terms of either positive or 
negative reciprocity. We mainly describe them in terms of negative reciprocity, because we 
believe that this is more important and salient in the real world.  
 We 
find that even in these circumstances, some people do group-reciprocate. 
In the next section we review the relevant literature in psychology and economics. We then 
describe our experiment and results. Lastly we draw conclusions. 
Related Literature 
Experimental economists have recently become interested in the effects of group membership 
on behaviour, a topic that has long fascinated social psychologists.  Hargreaves Heap and 
Zizzo (2009) show experimentally that people will put a monetary value on group 
membership. Further, people discriminate between in- and outgroups.  They cooperate more 
3  Like all economic experiments on adults, our experiment cannot determine whether psychological 
dispositions to group reciprocity are innate, or are learned from repeated exposure to situations where group 
reciprocity was appropriate behaviour.  
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in-group members more, reward them more for good behaviour, and punish them less (Chen 
and Li 2009). Debate continues over whether this different behaviour is driven by 
expectations of future reciprocity (Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000; Yamagishi and Mifune 
2008, 2009) or by pure preferences (Guala et al. 2009).As psychologists have long noted 
(Brewer 1999), the existence of intergroup bias per se does not imply that people will behave 
unkindly towards members of an outgroup, only that they will behave more kindly towards 
members of their ingroup. For example, when asked to allocate a “bad” (exposure to aversive 
noise) among ingroup and outgroup members, subjects showed no ingroup bias (Mummendey 
1992). Yet, in real-world conflicts, real groups often do terrible things to each other. 
Furthermore, some lab experiments have induced harmful conflicts between groups. For 
instance, Bornstein (1992, 2003) observed that subjects contributed to a public good which 
benefitted members of the ingroup and harmed outgroup members (and was inefficient for the 
“society” as a whole). Thus, subjects were willing to harm outgroups so as to help the 
ingroup. Even more strikingly, Abbink and Herrmann (2009) created a ten-round vendetta 
game, with subjects in two groups: in each round, subjects could deduct money from the other 
group, at a cost to themselves. The low observed rates of this harmful behaviour (13%) were 
tripled (40%) by the addition of a symbolic reward.
4
Therefore, there seems to be a gap between individual-level motivation and collective 
outcomes, whether in the lab or the field. We believe that dispositions to group reciprocity 
may be part of the answer. Individual biases towards one's own group, which are (relatively) 
innocuous in ordinary circumstances, can be transformed into something much more 
 
4  But not every experiment reproduces such effects; see e.g. Halevy et al. (2008). 
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5
Psychologists have investigated third-party group reciprocity under the term “vicarious 
retribution” (Lindgren et al. 2006).  However, while experiments have shown that subjects 
will verbally express a demand for sanctions in retaliation for a presumed intergroup insult 
(Stenstrom et al. 2008), we know of no psychological experiment demonstrating intergroup 
retribution with real material consequences. Some economic experiments are suggestive: for 
instance, in Abbink and Herrmann (2009), rates of harmful actions were increased by the 
other group's harmful actions in the previous round. Similarly, Reuben and van Winden 
(2008) show that friends are more likely to coordinate their punishment of an unkind 
proposer, and to punish more severely, in a power-to-take game. These experiments cannot 
wholly rule out strategic motivations, however – whether within-game in the multiple round 
setup, or outside the lab for friends.Our experiment therefore tests whether people will 
reciprocate the actions of one group member when they make choices affecting other 
 Some analyses of field 
data support this idea. Shayo and Zussman (2010) show that Israeli judges were more likely to 
find in favour of Israeli plaintiffs against Arab defendants shortly after terrorist incidents. This 
could be explained by increased solidarity with the ingroup, or by bias against an outgroup 
which is perceived  as responsible for an attack. (Though Arab judges were also more likely 
to find in favour of Arabs against Israelis after an attack, which favours the ingroup solidarity 
interpretation.) In a military context, Kocher et al. (2008) show that indiscriminate US 
bombing in Vietnam increased Vietcong control, suggesting that it drove Vietnamese civilians 
“into the arms of the rebels”. 
5  Moreno (2008) provides a game-theoretic analysis of group fairness, which includes the idea of intergroup 
reciprocity. 
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players' behaviour towards oneself.  
Experimental design 
Our experiment was run at the Jena laboratory of the Max Planck Institute for Economics, 
using zTree.
6
In each session of our experiment, 30 subjects were randomly allocated into three groups 
named red, green and blue. In order to increase group entitativity (the sense that each group 
forms a single entity) and identification, the groups played a team game. This was an adapted 
version of the card game Pelmanism, in which players have to find pairs of identical cards 
from a face-down deck. In our computer version, the whole group voted for which card to 
turnover, and one selected member then observed the votes and chose a card. The group 
which found the most pairs was awarded 5 ECU. However, the winning group was not 
revealed until the end of the experiment. 
 180 subjects, recruited using ORSEE, took part during 6 sessions. Each session 
lasted about 1 hour. 
Each subject was given a player number, running from 1-10 within each group. These 
numbers, together with the group names, were used to identify subjects to each other 
throughout the remainder of the experiment. 
After the Pelmanism game, subjects were allocated into pairs, each pair containing subjects 
from two different groups. They were informed of their partner's group and player number. 
They then played a one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD). Afterwards, subjects were shown their 
6  Screenshots of the interface are available online in the file screenshots.zip 
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partner's group the Partner group; the remaining group is the Other group. For instance, if a 
red group member played the prisoner's dilemma against a green group member, then for her 
the green group is the Partner group, and the blue group is the Other group. 
Lastly, each subject made a set of ten binary choices, allocating money between him- or 
herself and other subjects, always identified by their player number and group. Four 
allocations were between the subject and a member of the Partner group. Four further 
allocations involved identical amounts of money as the first four, but were between the 
subject and a member of the Other group. Two allocations were between a Partner group 
member and an Other group member, with the subject herself not being involved. Subjects 
never made allocations involving their previous PD partner – only involving other members 
of the same group. Subjects could easily observe this, because the PD partner's group and 
player number, along with the outcome of the PD, was shown onscreen throughout the 10 
allocations. 
The order of the allocations was randomized. At the end of the experiment a single allocation 
was randomly chosen, and the relevant payoffs were implemented. 
After the experiment, subjects were given a questionnaire including demographics, measures 
of group identity, and debriefing questions. The winning group of the Pelmanism game was 
then revealed. Finally, subjects were called up and paid privately for their winnings from 
Pelmanism game, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the randomly chosen allocations (their own 
and others'), as well as a EUR 2.50 showup fee. 
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The ten allocation choice sets are shown in Table 1. Subjects chose either option A or option 
B: the amounts allocated are shown in the corresponding columns.
7
 Each set had one option which gave strictly less to the other player. We call this the unkind 
option. Each also had one selfish option which gave strictly more to the subject herself; the 
other option was costly. Lastly one option was equal because it had a strictly lower difference 
between the subject and the other player. 
 We number the five 
different kinds of choices from 1-5. Each choice was made twice, against a member of the 
Partner group and against a member of the Other group (or for choice set 5, the positions of 
Partner and Other players were switched). The two choices within each pair are differentiated 
by the suffix P or O. 
7  On subjects' screens, the order and labels of the columns were randomized. 
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In four of the 8 choices, the unkind option was also selfish. Thus, choosing the unkind option 
can reflect simple material self-interest, while the kind option may be altruistic. In the other 
four choices, the unkind option was not selfish: to harm the other player, subjects had to harm 
themselves. These choices can be thought of as “costly punishment”. There are real world 
analogues in conflict situations, in which people may put themselves at risk in order to harm 
those in other groups. 
1P A B 1O A B
s 2 1 s 2 1
P 5 2 O 5 2
2P A B 2O A B
s 4 3 s 4 3
P 3 0 O 3 0
3P A B 3O A B
s 1 2 s 1 2
P 4 1 O 4 1
4P A B 4O A B
s 4 5 s 4 5
P 3 0 O 3 0
5P A B 5O A B
O 3 1 P 3 1
P 1 2 O 1 2
S = self, P = prisoner's dilemma PARTNER's group, O = OTHER group
Numbers are ECUs.
Choices 1-4 are self-other choices. Choice 5 allocates money between two other subjects.
In the self-other choices:
Choice B is always unkind.
In choices 1-2, the selfish choice is kind.
In choices 3-4, the selfish choice is unkind.
In choices 2 and 4, the equal choice is kind.
In choices 1 and 3, the equal choice is unkind.
Table 1: Choice sets 
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Dilemma, the choice of their partner to cooperate or to defect was random and uncorrelated 
with any of the subject's characteristics. Therefore, we can treat partners' choices as an 
exogenous between-subjects treatment. We can then examine subjects' levels of unkindness 
towards Partner group members (members of the PD partner's group) and towards Other 
group members, comparing these differences among subjects whose partners defected, and 
among those whose partners cooperated. We can also repeat this analysis for particular 
choices, including those where unkindness is selfish or not, and those where the unkind 
choice is equal or not; and for particular subject groups, including those who did or did not 
themselves cooperate in the Prisoner's Dilemma. 
Results 
Descriptive and demographic statistics are shown in Table 9 in the Appendix. In particular, 
we deliberately invited a high proportion of males. Since a large majority of active 
participants in violent group conflicts are male (see for instance Archer 2004 or Scheff 2003), 
we believed that group reciprocity might be easier to observe in a male-dominated 
environment. 
In the Prisoner's Dilemma, 64 subjects defected and 116 cooperated. The above-average 
cooperation rates are probably due to framing: in the PD description, we described each 
player as having an “endowment” of 2 ECUs, some of which would be “lost” if the other 
player defected.  
We first examine the self-other choice sets (numbers 1-4). Before differentiating between 
decisions for Partner and Other groups, we look at decisions in general.  
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Choice sets   Unkind decision is...  … cooperated  … defected  P-value (χ
2 test) 
1  Costly, equal  10.7%  14.8%  0.337 
2  Costly, unequal  6.0%  2.3%  0.187 
3  Selfish, equal  85.8%  88.3%  0.612 
4  Selfish, unequal  50.4%  63.3%  0.025 
Table 2: Unkind decisions by subject's action in the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Table 2 shows the percentage of unkind decisions for each of the self-other choice sets, split 
by whether the subject cooperated or defected in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Except where the 
selfish decision was both harmful to the other and inegalitarian, large majorities chose the 
selfish decision, and there was no significant difference between those  who cooperated or not 
in the PD. This was true even though the selfish decision in choice sets 3 & 8 was inefficient 
(lowered the total amount paid to the pair). However, when the selfish decision was harmful 
to the other and inegalitarian (and also inefficient), decisions were more evenly split, and 
significantly more PD defectors were selfish than PD cooperators.  
Table 3 shows the percentage of unkind decisions, split by whether the subject's partner in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma cooperated or defected. The last column reports P-values from a  χ
2 test. 
Costly unkindness in general seems to have been affected by the PD partner's choice, but in 
opposite ways depending on whether the unkind decision increased or decreased inequality: 
players became more likely to choose the more equal option, whether this harmed or helped 
the other player. Possibly, the other player's cooperation in the PD activated a norm of 
cooperative behaviour, which had an egalitarian component.  
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Choice sets   Unkind decision is...  … cooperated  … defected  P-value (χ
2 test) 
1  Costly, equal  15.1%  7.0%  0.038 
2  Costly, unequal  3.0%  7.8%  0.072 
3  Selfish, equal  85.3%  89.0%  0.406 
4  Selfish, unequal  52.6%  59.4%  0.259 
Table 3: Unkind decisions by subject's partner's action in the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Now, we examine our main question: if their PD partners defected, did subjects react 
differently to the two groups? To do this, we compare subjects' behaviour to the Partner group 
and the Other group. Table 4 shows the percentage of unkind decisions, disaggregated into 
decisions against (members of) the Partner and Other groups, and by whether the subject's 
Prisoner's Dilemma partner played Cooperate or Defect. Figure 1 shows the same information 
graphically. 





Partner group  Other group   Partner group  Other group 
1  Costly, equal  12.1%  18.1%  9.4%  4.7% 
2  Costly, unequal  4.3%  1.7%  7.8%  7.8% 
3  Selfish, equal  87.1%  83.6%  89.1%  89.1% 
4  Selfish, unequal  53.4%  51.7%  65.6%  53.1% 
Table 4: Unkind decisions by PD partner's action and target group  
To analyse this data, we look at subjects' choices in each pair of decisions, split up by 
whether their PD partner defected or cooperated. In this way we can use the within-subject 
aspect of our design to see if subjects took decisions differently depending on whether they 
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decisions, we report P-values for a binomial test of whether subjects were significantly more 
unkind to the Partner than to the Other group.
 The test uses “discordant pairs” – subjects who 
were unkind to the Partner group member but not the Other group member, or subjects who 
were unkind to the Other group member but not the Partner group member. Under the null 
hypothesis, the proportion of all discordant pairs in either one of these two categories is 
binomially distributed with parameter 0.5. Thus, when there are many more subjects being 
Figure 1: Unkind decisions by choice set and PD partner's action 
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we report two-tailed significance tests for consistency with other tests in the paper.) 
 
  Choice sets 1/6: 
PD partner... 
Choice set 2: 
PD partner... 
Choice set 3: 
PD partner... 
Choice set 4: 
PD partner... 
Choice for Partner 
group/Other group 
Cooperated  Defected  Cooperated  Defected  Cooperated  Defected  Cooperated  Defected 






9 (7.8%)  5 (7.8%)  47 (40.5%)  19 
(29.7%) 
Kind/unkind  8 (6.9%)  2 (3.1%)  0 (0.0%)  3 (4.7%)  6 (5.2%)  2 (3.1%)  7 (6.0%)  3 (4.7%) 
Unkind/kind  1 (0.9%)  5 (7.8%)  3 (2.6%)  3 (4.7%)  10 (8.6%)  2 (3.1%)  9 (7.8%)  11 
(17.2%) 
Unkind/unkind  13 (11.2%)  1 (1.6%)  2 (1.7%)  2 (3.1%)  91 (78.4%)  55 
(85.9%) 




0.039*  0.45  0.250  1  0.454  1  0.804  0.0574+ 
Column percentages in parentheses. P-value is two-tailed. 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10. 
Table 5: Pairs of decisions, by PD partner's choice 
There are two statistically significant results.  
Result 1: When the unkind decision was costly and egalitarian, subjects were 
significantly kinder to the Partner group if their PD partner had cooperated, but were 
not significantly kinder if their partner had defected.  
First, in choice set 1, where the unkind decision was costly and egalitarian, if the PD partner 
cooperated, subjects were significantly less likely to choose the unkind decision for the 
Partner group than for the Other group (p=0.039). There was no significant difference if the 
PD partner defected. Thus, we must qualify the previous claim that cooperation by the PD 
partner increased egalitarianism. It appears to have only done so for the Other group. One 
interpretation is that there were countervailing motives: the PD partner's defection decreased 
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partner's group. 
Result 2: When unkindness was selfish and inegalitarian, defection by a subject's PD 
partner increased the subject's unkindness to the Partner group, relative to the Other 
group. 
Second, in choice set 4 where the unkind decision was selfish and unequal, if the PD partner 
defected, subjects were more likely to choose the unkind decision for the Partner group than 
for the Other group. The increase in selfishness towards the Partner group after partner's 
defection is quite large (from 53.4% to 65.6%), although significance is weak (p=0.057). 
In a final non-parametric test, we sum “discordant pairs” over all five choice sets. After the 
PD partner defected, a total of 31 decision pairs discriminated against the Partner group, while 
17 discriminated against the Other group (binomial test, p=0.059). After the PD partner 
cooperated, 41 decision pairs discriminated against the Partner group, while 33 discriminated 
against the Other group (binomial test, p=0.416). 
Regression models 
We examine choices further by modelling each pair of choice sets as a bivariate probit, 
allowing subjects' decisions to be correlated within the pair. The independent variable, as 
before, is whether the PD partner defected. We report results only for sets 1 and 4: other 
choice sets gave null results as before. The dependent variables take the value of 1 if the 
subject chose the unkind decision, and 0 otherwise, for the Partner group and for the Other 
group respectively.  
  Choice set 1  Choice set 4 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 066Partner: intercept  -1.203 (0.152) ***  -0.088 (0.117) 
Partner: PD partner defected  -0.080 (0.261)  0301 (0.198) 
Other: intercept  -0.919 (0.136) ***  0.043 (0.116)  
Other: PD partner defected  -0.644 (0.281) *  0.041 (0.195) 
Correlation (ρ)  0.880  0.878 
N  180  180 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10. 
Table 6: Binomial probit regressions 
The results for choice set 1 confirm that the PD partner's defection decreased the probability 
of taking the unkind decision only for the Other group. For choice set 4, the effect of the PD 
partner's decision just misses 10% significance for the Partner group and is insignificant for 
the Other group. The significance and signs of parameters can be misleading in non-linear 
models, so Table 7 shows the effect of PD partner's defection in terms of probabilities.
8
8  The raw probabilities are shown in Table 9 in the Appendix. 
 In 
both cases, defection increases the probability of being unkind to the Partner group only, and 
decreases the probability of being unkind to the Other group only. This is  what one would 
expect if subjects were group-reciprocating. Looking at the effect on unkindness to each 
group in general (i.e., including the possibility that the subject was unkind to both groups), 
defection makes subjects kinder in choice 1, and unkinder in choice 4, but the size of the 
effects varies between the groups by roughly an order of magnitude: subjects get much kinder 
to the Other group, and much unkinder to the Partner group, in the respective decisions. 
Lastly we report the p-value of the null hypothesis that the first two rows are equal, i.e. that 
subjects' behaviour to each group is affected in the same way by PD partner defection. (This 
is also the p-value of the equivalent hypothesis that the last two rows are equal.) The null is 
strongly rejected for choice set 1, but cannot be rejected for set 4. 
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when PD partner defected  
Choice set 1  Choice set 4 
1. Unkind to Partner group only  3.37 (2.67)  6.13 (4.18) 
2. Unkind to Other group only  -7.15 (2.53)**  -3.87 (2.24)+ 
3. Unkind to Partner group (any 
decision for Other group) 
-1.47 (4.74)  11.63 (7.53) 
4. Unkind to Other group (any 
decision for Partner group) 
-11.99 (4.58)**  1.63 (7.77) 
Prob(1=2)  0.015  0.111 
Standard errors in parentheses (calculated by the delta method). 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10. 
Table 7: Change in probabilities of unkind decisions, from bivariate probits 
Interpretation 
Due to the lack of high statistical significance, the results obtained above need to be handled 
with care. Nevertheless, we can form some tentative hypotheses. 
First, group reciprocity did not affect all decisions equally. Effects were only significant or 
large when decisions pitted self-interest against inequality concerns. When subjects were 
asked to make a straight allocation between Partner and Other group members, with their own 
payoffs not involved, no group discrimination was observed. This suggests to us that 
reciprocity operates via changes in self-other inequality concerns, rather than via changes in 
altruism or spitefulness towards different groups. Indeed, if group spite had been a prominent 
motivation, it ought to have been so in choice set 3 as well – which was not observed.  
In choice set 1, self-interest conflicted with a dislike of other-favouring inequality: choosing 
the best outcome for yourself meant giving the other subject 3 Euros more than you. In 
general, subjects were more likely to choose this outcome after their partners defected in the 
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against the Partner group. 
It seems counter-intuitive that decisions concerning the Other group should be changed more 
by PD partner's defection than decisions concerning the Partner group. There are two 
possibilities. (1) We may have observed two countervailing effects. Subjects may have feared 
leaving the experiment with low earnings, or experiencing defection lessened their attachment 
to fairness norms, and this made them more self-interested in general; on the other hand, some 
subjects also wished to punish the partner group. (2) Subjects might have a specific “desire to 
discriminate” which could result in them becoming simultaneously nastier to their PD 
partner's group, and kinder to the other group. Although the data cannot differentiate these 
explanations, we favour the first. 
In choice set 4, self-interest conflicted with a dislike of self-favouring inequality: choosing the 
best outcome for yourself meant giving the other subject much less than yourself. Here, more 
straightforwardly, experiencing defection made subjects more likely to be unkind to the PD 
partner's group and less likely to be  unkind to the Other group. Significance levels for these 
choices are not so high, however. 
 
In many circumstances, discriminatory behaviour may be driven by beliefs rather than by 
preferences. For example, ethnic discrimination in hiring may come from “tastes” (Becker 
1957), or from statistical or screening discrimination (Arrow 1972). Similarly, Yamagishi et 
al. (2000) suggest that ingroup favouritism happens because people believe that other group 
members will reciprocate their nice behaviour. However, in our experiment, changes in 
beliefs about future behaviour are ruled out: players simply make allocation decisions and 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 066know that other players cannot react to them.
9
Conclusion 
 Thus, the behaviour we observe must come 
from preferences, not beliefs. However, we caution against too narrow an interpretation of 
preferences. Group reciprocity may be due to the activation of context-specific norms, rather 




Most economic models assume that humans are rational and materially self-interested. In 
many areas of economic life, evidence from laboratory and the field has cast doubt on these 
assumptions. One of the most important differences between real humans and those in 
economic models, we suspect, is that real humans act in groups, and treat other groups as 
actors. As a result they may assign blame and praise to groups as well as individuals – with 
important consequences for human society and politics. Often in history, entire groups have 
been scapegoated and blamed for their members' real or imagined behaviour. It is important to 
9  We cannot rule out that this behaviour is caused by “counterfactual reciprocity”, where subjects take action 
because of what they expect others would have done, e.g. if their positions had been reversed. In fact, it is 
hard to rule this out completely for any kind of decision. However, we can rule out expectations about actual 
future behaviour. 
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money payoffs, we showed that subjects responded to behaviour by one member of a group 
by treating other members of that group differently. There was evidence for reciprocity both 
when harming the other group was materially beneficial (choice set 4) and when it was costly 
(choice set 1). Thus, group reciprocity seems to be part of human psychology. 
Not all our subjects showed group reciprocity, and it was not visible in all decisions. To 
investigate the causes and correlates of group reciprocity, our experimental paradigm needs 
further refinement. In particular, continuous rather than discrete decisions might allow for 
more accurate measurement of individuals' levels of reciprocity. Complementary experiments 
could also be done using homegrown identities such as ethnicity. And for external validity, 
theories derived from the lab will need to be tested against behaviour in real world group 
conflicts. Finally, we have still to investigate third-party group reciprocity: when people 
retaliate against a group for harm done not to themselves, but to a fellow group member of 
their own. 
We hope that demonstrating group reciprocity in a reproducible laboratory experiment will 
open the door to deeper exploration of how it works. We can draw an analogy with the 
“minimal group paradigm” in psychology. After Shaerif's (1966) initial research in the 1950s 
on in-group prejudice – the famous Robber's Cave experiment –  researchers developed a 
canonical experiment (“paradigm”) to analyse in-group prejudice. By making the behaviour 
of interest reproducible, the minimal group paradigm catalysed much productive research into 
prejudice. Many kinds of group reciprocal behaviour – racial prejudice, discrimination and 
conflict – belong to the extremes of human conduct. However, it is not necessarily true that 
extreme situations have their own special psychology. Group reciprocity may happen not only 
in Yugoslavia or Rwanda, but also in ordinary life, between football supporters or the 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 066employees of rival firms. If so, then it ought to be replicable in the laboratory. Therefore, we 
hope that other researchers will take up and refine our experimental design.  
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N  180 
Demographics 
Male  142 (78.89%) 
Studying:   
… Law  8 (4.44%) 
… Social sciences  56 (31.11%) 
… Economics  27 (15.00%) 
… Natural sciences  38 (21.11%) 
… Other  38 (21.11%) 
… Not a student  13 (7.22%) 
Age  Min 19, max 67, mean 24.6, median 24 
Prisoner's Dilemma choices (self, other) 
CC  72 (40.00%)  DC  44 (24.44%) 
CD  44 (24.44%)  DD  20 (11.11%) 
Allocations (those choosing option 2) 
Choice set 1P  20 (11.11%)  Choice set 1O  24 (13.33%) 
Choice set 2P  10 (5.56%)  Choice set 2O  7 (3.89%) 
Choice set 3P  158 (87.78%)  Choice set 3O  154 (85.56%) 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 066Choice set 4P  104 (57.78%)  Choice set 4O  94 (52.22%) 
Choice set 5P  71 (39.44%)  Choice set 5O  80 (44.44%) 
Group identity Likert scales (1=not at all, 7=very much) 
It is fun to be part of the COLOUR group  ≤ 2: 49 (27.22%); ≥ 6: 24 (13.33%); mean 3.66 
It feels good to be part of the COLOUR group  ≤ 2: 66 (36.67%); ≥ 6: 20 (11.11%); mean 3.34 
I am happy to be in the COLOUR group  ≤ 2: 51 (28.33%); ≥ 6: 22 (12.22%); mean 3.56 
I think members of the COLOUR group have a 
lot to be proud of 
≤ 2: 53 (29.44%); ≥ 6: 18 (10.00%); mean 3.57 
I feel solidarity with members of the COLOUR 
group 
≤ 2: 39 (21.67%); ≥ 6: 33 (18.33%); mean 3.99 
I feel connected to the COLOUR group  ≤ 2: 49 (27.22%); ≥ 6: 34 (18.89%); mean 3.83 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics 
 
  Choice sets 1/4: 
PD partner... 
Choice sets 6/9: 
PD partner... 
Choice for Partner 
group/Other group 
Cooperated  Defected  Cooperated  Defected 
Kind/kind  80.2%  88.8%  39.4%  31.7% 
Kind/unkind  8.4%  1.2%  7.1%  3.2% 
Unkind/kind  1.9%  5.3%  8.8%  15.0% 
Unkind/unkind  9.5%  4.7%  44.7%  50.2% 
Table 9: Predicted probabilities from binomial probits 
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